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Abstract
The grounds of examination are such air traffic challenges
as the traffic increase. The focus here is on the safety of com-
mercial transport flights. This paper demonstrates how a tech-
nology transfer with three-point approach can elicit information
that the aircraft, aerodrome and air traffic control require to fly
the aircraft safely and efficiently in case of traffic growth, and
the „soft” background, i.e. the legal and organisational base of
it. This paper is intended as a portal for information exchange
between rail and air transportation. It also refers to human fac-
tors, as possibly instable elements of the system, and because
of these, the adaptation of fuzzy logic regarding safety- related
systems and processes.
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1 Introduction
The grounds of examination are such air traffic challenges as
the traffic increase, which will be doubled in the next 20 years
[1]. The increase is faster in Central Europe. The focus here
is on the safety of commercial transport flights carrying passen-
gers and/or freight receiving an Air Traffic Control (ATC) ser-
vice, focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on mid-air collision
risk, and the safety issues of ground movements. This paper is
intended as a portal for information exchange between rail and
air transportation, also refers to human factors, as possibly insta-
ble elements of the system, and because of these, the adaptation
of fuzzy logic regarding safety-related systems and processes.
Concerning safety-related aspects, the two modes of trans-
portation are intercorrected along the following three points of
view: automation of ground operations in air transportation, hu-
man factors, and as a result, the paper contains a preliminary
evaluation contributing to the reduction of gaps in these systems,
furthermore enables the exploration of such new applications,
like the use of fuzzy logic based modelling system.
2 Standards, assignments, and recommended prac-
tices
Regarding air transportation the dominant view of current
procedures is based on unified way of looking. The Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a specialised agency
of the United Nations, sets the minimum Standards and Recom-
mended Practices (SARP) for international civil aviation. In-
dividual States remain responsible for regulating their aviation
industries, but have to take into account the requirements of
the Convention (EU) and the minimum standards established
by ICAO. In Europe the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) are
responsible for the production and publication of Joint Avia-
tion Requirements (JARs) and the associated guidance and ad-
ministrative documents. The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) is taking over the responsibility for regulating airwor-
thiness and maintenance issues within the EU Member States.
The JAA will retain its present function for operations and li-
censing as well as airworthiness and maintenance issues for the
JAA member states outside EASA [2]. Note, that even if in the
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air transportation the safety management system has compre-
hensive way of looking, there can be also found gaps, by rea-
son of which the safety management system has to be checked.
The Group of Aerodrome Safety Regulators (GASR) has pro-
duced a set of requirements for the systematic management of
safety, in an effort to harmonise the regulatory approach to the
“how” of aerodrome operations to complement the “what” that
is provided by ICAO SARPs. It is understood that a National
Aviation Safety Authority according to national legislative pro-
visions will adopt the requirements. The regulator is the Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) Safety Regulation Group (SRG). Dif-
ferent countries have different kinds of structures, but the re-
sponsibilities and professional tasks are broadly similar.
Regarding this issue an aerodrome organisation shall rou-
tinely carry out safety audits to provide assurance of the safety
of activities and to confirm compliance with the safety require-
ments and the safety management system (SMS), by
• establishing a reporting system for accident and incident-
reporting ensuring that the National Aviation Safety Author-
ity is informed of the aviation safety aspects in connection
with the operation of the Aerodrome;
• establishing and maintaining procedures for ability to trace all
documents and data related to the SMS [3].
For aerodrome operators there are provisions written in ICAO
Annex 14 about implementation of an SMS. ICAO has also is-
sued a Manual on Aerodrome Certification that includes SMS,
Doc. 9774. For the Flight Operations side JAA has issued
JAR OPS 1 and 3 containing Quality System requirements. Air-
craft Operators and Air Navigation Service Providers, may con-
tribute towards risks that could affect the aircraft operations.
JAR 25/1309 and ESARR 4 (Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Re-
quirement Number 4) can be used and adapted depending upon
the area of operation that the risk analysis is focused on. Haz-
ard identification and risk management are proactive methods
in that there are the systematic examination of potentially haz-
ardous activities to establish safe, effective procedures and prac-
tices. Analysis of hazardous activities will identify areas of rel-
atively higher risk that require monitoring. This enables de-
fences to be developed and contingency plans to be produced
and implemented. Risk assessment matrices facilitate conclu-
sions about what combination of probability of occurrence and
seriousness of consequences may be accepted as tolerable levels
of risk. Incidentally: regarding rail and air transportation these
limit values and procedures are not very far from each other,
although these are not interdependently developed, and for in-
stance in pursuance of quantifying parts of the risk analysis in
aviation tolerable hazard rates are derived by Functional Hazard
Assessment (FHA) without an analysis of statistics [4]. An Avi-
ation Community organisation with its facilities, equipment and
systems shall be designed and operated so that for any risk the
combination of probability of occurrence and seriousness of the
consequences of the hazard frequency must not result in a level
of risk that is unacceptable [5, 6].
3 Critical points of air traffic growth
Relation between the number of flights and the rate of acci-
dents is quadratic. In case of three flights there are three poten-
tial conflicts (Fig. 1), but in case of six ones there are twelve
potential conflicts (Fig. 1b), in the air. [7, 8].
 
a. b.
Fig. 1. Conflict points in case of three and six flights
I.e. on the ground and also in the air the potential of airports
must be revalued, new concepts wanted to guarantee the level of
safety. The prime goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM)
system is to control accident risk.
On the ground two relevant points are in the safety-related,
complex airport – air traffic control – aircraft system triangle re-
garding traffic growth, such as ramp safety and runway (RWY)
incursions. Apron safety includes every single movements, ac-
tions on the airport, like for example ground operations related
functions. This paper focuses on accent on runway incursions.
The causes of these cases are mainly human factors, as seen at
Table 1.
Tab. 1. Number of RWY incursions
Number of RWY incursions
Year
Kind of failure Total
Pilot Operative Pedestrian/vehicle
failure failure failure
2001 233 91 83 407
2002 191 75 73 339
2003 174 89 60 323
2004 173 97 56 326
2005 169 105 53 327
2006 190 39 51 280
In case of mid-air movements ATC is carried out by what are
often termed Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP), ATC
uses several kinds of technical entity: communications, navi-
gation, surveillance and data processing. Data processing links
the continuous (CNS) functions. Communication systems, both
air–ground and between controllers and ATC centres, including
both voice and electronic data transmission, are an integral part
of ATC: effective ATC requires the controller to communicate
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with the pilot. Surveillance also is now an integral part of ATC:
radars are there so that controllers can see position information
on screens. Navigation is different. Controllers do not navigate
aircraft, but ANSPs do provide some ground aids for aircraft,
while others are independent on-board systems (e.g. altimetry
for vertical navigation) [9]. The area is shared by sectors. In
case of traffic growth, the task of air traffic controllers is also
shared. It means, that regarding mid-air movements, more sec-
tors are opened. The same applies to Area Control Center (ACC)
and Approach Control (APP) fields. The limit is approx. twelwe
aircrafts per sector. That is a normal pressure for a controller.
The influence of the human factor is obvious, and the question
also: where is the limit of the actually used method?
4 Technology transfer options for improving air safety
ATC has information about the likely paths of flights, and
therefore can pass instructions to the pilot that will provide safe
passage on taxiways, runways and in flight. Currently the con-
trol of ground operation movements is performed by optical and
radio navigation facilities, but the loop of information is closed
by human decision. At the end of the information chain is either
the pilot or the air traffic controller. This generates the ques-
tion, whether with this method the required level of safety can
be maintained in case of the estimated traffic growth. The pos-
sible solution can be the application of a much more automated
ground operation system like e.g. in the rail transportation cur-
rently used interlocking, signalling and train control system.
4.1 Looking at air transportation from the field of railway
As trains are guided by the rails and the points in the track,
railways can only be operated safely and efficiently with ade-
quate means for signalling, train control and train communica-
tion. Today, while the cockpit is becoming increasingly auto-
mated, controllers and pilots still communicate by radio. Single
European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) is the technological part
of the single European sky initiative, launched in 2004 to re-
form the organisation of air traffic control. It will introduce new
communication, control and computing technologies between
the ground and the aircraft which will optimise the work of air
traffic controllers and pilots [3]. It would like also to find new
procedures to risk mitigation in Air Traffic Management (ATM).
Despite of these developments, the safety view, applied in the
railway transportation, does not appear in the air transportaton.:
sign and intervention by safety equipments by the ground oper-
ations. The focus is still on the ATC, hereby human resources
and sign, but not on direct intervention. In a related work [6],
we underline that the actually used references, structures and
strategies are poorly supported in the current system, and con-
sequently this can be a source for air traffic controllers and pi-
lots confusion and misunderstanding of radio communication.
Instead of inventing new ways of presenting safety-related in-
formation other modes of transportation’s own information use
strategies should be supported and used.
4.2 Human factors
Many literature deal with human errors, human factors in the
transportation, also discussed narrowed down regarding certain
elements of air transportation, like the behaviour of pilots and
air controllers [10], [11], [12]. In this case it is much more rele-
vant issue because of the character of the transportation process,
as can be seen from the previous pharagraph. The point of inter-
est of these studies, that the examined person is always checked
in oneself, or in restricted environment, like for example cock-
pit, but not as member with exact failure factor in the complex
airport – air traffic control – aircraft system triangle. The result
of such examinations shows up e.g., that the use of references,
structures and strategies to inform design can produce more ef-
ficient displays, where pilots perform twice as fast and with less
error [10]. After all, to manage as safety relevant, comlex air
traffic process, every single human intervention point and its in-
fluence have to be accounted numerically, and the appropriate
feedback has to be performed.
Hereby the failure behaviour of the system could be ensured.
One of the implementation possibilities could be the use of fuzzy
logic, and further refinement of the risk analysis could be the
flight-specific risk analysis based on fuzzy logic decision model,
human decision interlocked in a dynamic reaction plan.
4.3 Application of fuzzy logic
Fuzzy logic have been already applied in air transportation.
On the score of aircrew rostering problem or airspace daily oper-
ational sectorization was discussed e.g. by fuzzy logic [13, 14].
The question is: in what circumstances can future accident risk
really be modelled with sufficient precision, and how should
it be assured with traffic growth and operational and technical
changes? This section first outlines some background on impor-
tant features of target levels of safety (TLS). The TLS relates to
total system design. A TLS covers all aviation-related causes.
It is usually derived by taking historical accident rates, which
show a progressive reduction over time, and extrapolating for-
ward, get tighter and tighter over time [15]. Mid-air collisions
are now rare. Because of this rarity, it is not possible to esti-
mate the current accident rate in Europe with great statistical
confidence from historical data on accidents. Estimates of the
future accident rate (an actual level of safety—ALS), given traf-
fic growth and new operational and technical features, therefore
rely on risk modelling. Risk modelling has to rely on an un-
derstanding of the causes represented in accident types, which
necessarily includes extrapolation of present system features, in
particular human performance and failure rates [9]. To include
the effects of human factors, the human decision also has to be
modelled in order to reveal the subjectivism of human decision.
This could be depicted diagrammatically to show how complex
the evolution of information with the help of fuzzy logic, the
person and the infrastrutural background as a fuzzy controller is.
It shows how information, coming from many sources, is con-
stantly changing, and being affected by events throughout the
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ground movements and flight. As follows the “gate to gate” con-
cept [16, 17] with taking into account the human factors, could
be numerical realised.
5 Summary
Given traffic growth and new operational and technical fea-
tures are subsystems, which necessarily include extrapolation of
present system features, in particular human performance and
failure rates. Despite of the growing number of flights, the plan-
ners still manage to incorporate the customers’ wishes.
This paper is intended to serve all parties involved in avia-
tion safety, including acting as a planning and a tracking tool to
monitor progress in the relevant areas of activity and practical
application. The objectives and fundamentals of the paper are
addressed by different focus areas. Reviewing the causal factors
of aircraft accidents in order to identify specific safety issues
which must be addressed to reduce accident numbers and rates,
attention must be paid to the reasons for regional variations in
accident rates, which could be minimized by the aid of safety
procedures, used in other transportation systems. In the paper
three options were proposed:
1 Safety awareness by facilitating the effective sharing and use
of aviation and railway safety data and information could be
the first stage of the process.
2 Gaps filling to all safety-related fields, respectively enhance
the identification of deficiency, the air navigation field pro-
vided by all sources, including participation in a dialog to ex-
plore ways to reduce impediments, to the communication of
safety-related information.
3 Develop provisions and guidance materials for normal oper-
ations monitoring systems, such as fuzzy logic aided flight-
specific risk analysis.
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